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GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY

II

School of Law

Environmental Law and Justice Clinic

TO:

Derek Robinson, HPNS BRAC Environmental Coordinator
Department of the Navy
BRAC Program Management Office West
derek.j.robinsonl@navv.mil

FROM:

Greenaction for Health and Environmental Justice
Environmental Law and Justice Clinic, Golden Gate University
School of Law

RE:

Comments to the Draft 5 Year Review Hunters Point Naval Shipyard,
San Francisco, California, June 2018

DATE:

September 7, 2018

INTRODUCTION

I.

The Environmental Law and Justice Clinic ofthe Golden Gate University School
of Law subm its these comments to NA VF AC's Draft Parcel G Removal Site Evaluation
Work Plan, Former Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, San Francisco, Cal(fornia, June 2018
("Draft Review") , on behalf of Greenaction for Health and Environmenta l Justice

("Greenaction") and its members and constituents in Bayview Hunters Point, San
Francisco and in other communities located along San Francisco Bay.

Greenaction is a multiracial grassroots organization founded and led by grassroots
leaders from low-income and working class urban, rural , and indigenous communiti es.
Our mission to fight environmental racism and injustice and build a clean, healthy and just
future for all. Greenaction has been involved in health and environmental justice advocacy
in Bayview Hunters Point since it was founded in 1997. This low-income commun ity of
color continues to be negatively and dispropot1ionately impacted by pollution,
Mailing Address :
536 Mission Street
San Francisco, CA
94105-2968
Offices:
40 Jessie Street
Suite 530
San Francisco, CA
tel: (415) 442-6647
fax (415) 896-2450
www. gg u. ed u/la w/e Ijc

gentrifi cation, health disparities, and other forms of environmental, social and economic
injustice.
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Bayview Hunters Point residents have borne the brunt of the impacts ofthe toxic
and radioactive waste at the Hunters Pont Naval Shipyard ("HPNS"). As such, they have a
direct, personal and long-standing interest in assuring the maximal cleanup of the
Superfund site.

A. The Community Doubts the Navy's Commitment To Rebuilding
Trust

"The fraud and uncertainty surrounding Tt EC's work at HPNS has caused a
complete loss of trust in the Navy by the local community.'' 1 This is not a member of
Greenaction speaking. This is the Navy's Laura Duchnak, BRAC PMO's Director. She's
right.

Unfortunately, though the Navy acknowledges it has lost all credibility, it remains
adamant that it will do nothing to address or correct it. It continues to downplay the fraud
and its effects on the cleanup. It promises one thing but delivers another. It has not taken
the evidence of previous contamination in Parcel A at all seriously.

If the Navy truly wants to start to repair relations with the community, it must take
actions that demonstrate in concrete terms how it will change its approach. This is not just
another cleanup; it's a cleanup tainted by massive fraud.

As Ms. Duchnak's letter said, the fraud "had far-reaching consequences for the
United States, its employees, the City of San Francisco, the local residents, and the
taxpayers." The Navy should act like it. The loss of trust extends to the hazardous waste
cleanup as well.

The revisions of the Draft Parcel G Work Plan and this Drqft Review are likely to be
the first two tests of the Navy's willingness to change course. Will it live up to the
promises it made to the community to resample all Tetra Tech's work? Will it incorporate

1

Victim Impact Statement in the Matter ofUSv. Hubbard, Mach 15,2018, attached as Appendix IV.
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the community's concerns into its final work plan and five-year review? Or will it betray
the community's trust yet again?

B. The Draft Review Does Not Comply with Navy Policy

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA § 12l(c) sets forth the requirement for a five-year review:

If the President selects a remedial action that results in any hazardous
substances, pollutants, or contaminants remaining at the site, the President
shall review such remedial action no less often than each five years after the
initiation of such remedial action to assure that human health and the
environment are being protected by the remedial action being implemented.
In addition, if upon such review it is the judgment of the President that action
is appropriate at such site in accordance with section [104] or [106], the
President shall take or require such action. The President shall report to the
Congress a list of facilities for which such review is required, the results of
all such reviews, and any actions taken as a result of such reviews.
Similarly, Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations §300.430(f)(4)(ii)] states:

If a remedial action is selected that results in hazardous substances,
pollutants, or contaminants remaining at the site above levels that allow for
unlimited use and unrestricted exposure, the lead agency shall review such
action no less often than every five years after the initiation of the selected
remedial action.

To implement five-year reviews at properties owned by the Navy, it
promulgated a policy, Department o.fNavy Policyfor CERCLA Five-Year Reviews.

This Fourth Five-Year Review states its objective: "The purpose ofthe fourth
five-year review is to provide an update on the status of remedial actions (RAs) and
post-RA activities implemented since the third five-year review, evaluate whether
these RAs and post-RA activities are protective of human health and the environment,
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and assess the progress toward meeting the recommendations made in the third fiveyear review." 2

Unfortunately the Draft Review neither complies with the Department of Navy
Policy for CERCLA Five-Year Reviews nor the intention stated above. For example,

paragraph 9a ofthe policy states, "The Five Year Report should; 1) clearly state whether
the remedy is or is expected to be protective, 2) document any deficiencies identified
during the review, and 3) recommend specific actions to ensure that a remedy will be or
will continue to be protective.'' (Emphasis added, p. 4).

As further detailed below, the Draft Review fails in its most basic functionidentifying whether the remedies are protective. Rather, it equivocates. The Draft Review
must clearly state that the radiological remedies are NOT currently protective. And if the
Navy states that the remedies "will be" protective, it should detail what "specific actions"
will be taken, parcel by parcel, to assure that will be the case, as required by Navy policy.

Furthermore, the policy's paragraph 9b states, "Where necessary, five year review
reports should contain descriptions of follow up actions needed to achieve, or to continue
to ensure protectiveness. Along with these recommendations, the report should list a
timetable for performing the actions ... "

The Draft Review fails to contain descriptions of the specific actions the Navy will
take to achieve protectiveness. All it says is that the Navy intends to kick that can down
the road until2023. There is no explanation why what the Navy knows now is excluded; it
must be included.

The Navy must revise the Draft Review to comply with CERCLA's plain language
and to comply with its own policies.

2

Draft 5 Year Review Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, San Francisco, California, June 2018, p. 1-1.
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II.

RADIOLOGICAL- General Comments
A. Facts- The Navy Must Tell the Whole Truth
The Draft Review is similar to the Drc([t Parcel G Work Plan before it in the way

it: mischaracterizes the facts; minimizes the effects of Tetra Tech's radiological fraud and
its impact on the remediation; and abandons its public promises.

Emblematic ofthe Navy's recasting of facts are these remarkable assertions:

The Navy has completed an extensive review of the radiological remediation
documents and data as part of its evaluation of the potential contractor manipulation
and/or falsification of data_and has identified the areas where resurveying for
radionuclides is required to address all issues discovered during the Navy's
evaluation. Any available information on the status of the review and discoveries
made by the Nayy were considered during the development of this five-year review.
(p. 5-3.)
The Navy pretends it proactively has done everything it can to investigate and redress
the fraud, when nothing could be further from the truth. The Navy makes it plain in this
review that it still does not believe comprehensive sampling is necessary. Crucially, the Navy
actions were limited to a document review- Tetra Tech's discredited documents, no less. 3
Only when one parses the paragraph can one see the Navy's true intentions.

Start with the phrase, "potential contractor manipulation and/or falsification of
data." Despite numerous sworn whistleblower affidavits attesting to widespread fraud,
despite the Navy's own data review revealing evidence of fraud in approximately 40% of
samples in Parcels Band G, despite the EPA finding that the Navy's data review missed
about half the data problems, 4 and despite two criminal convictions of Tetra Tech
supervisors- the very supervisors identified as culpable in the whistleblowers' testimony
-the Navy still insists the fraud was "'potential.''

The Navy has provided only two of the 117 Tetra Tech documents listed in the Draft Review's
"References." See Section IIC below.
4 The contractor(s) that missed half the data problems have demonstrated their undependability. The
Navy should commit to obtaining different contractors that the Navy, the community and the regulators
can have confidence in.
3
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The Navy claims it "has identified the areas where resurveying for radionuclides is
required to address all issues discovered during the Navy's evaluation.'' That is simply
false, unless by "all areas'' the Navy means all of Parcels A, B, C, D, E, G, UC-1, UC-2
and UC-3. If the Navy truly has identified answers to all issues arising from the Tetra
Tech Fraud, why are they not included in the Draft Review? The Navy should identify"
the areas where resurveying for radionuclides is required" on maps of each parcel. (Also see
section III (I) below regarding Figure 3-13.)

So far the Navy has proposed resurveying only in one Parcel, Parcel G. The Draft

Work Plan for that project was so roundly criticized by comments made to it by EPA that
it was unresponsive to its concerns that it threatens to invoke the dispute-resolution
clauses ofthe Federal Facilities Agreement (FFA) if the Navy continues to ignore them:
''Without the requested changes, the approach will not provide the necessary confidence
level to establish when Parcel G would be suitable for redevelopment, and EPA may
invoke the dispute resolution process described in the FFA."

Then the Navy claims "any available information" was considered, but only "any
available information" from the data review, that is, any available Tetra Tech data.
Pointedly, the Navy cannot claim that it considered "any available information" without
that tremendously narrowing qualification.

Among the "available information'' the Navy ignores are: all of the
whistleblowers' sworn statements filed in support ofGreenaction's state and federal
petitions to revoke Tetra Tech's licenses; 5 eyewitness and documentary evidence,
including sampling documents and test results demonstrating there were elevated levels
ofradionuclides in Parcel A's sanitary and storm water sewer systems that should have
been investigated but never were; 6 lists of approximately 50 additional witnesses who the
Navy should interview; 7 and BRAC's own victim impact statement in the criminal cases

5

The federal petition and its supporting documents are incorporated herein and are available at:
https://www .dropbox.com/sh/1 gfn7ja0fc3c516/AAD7-9qzmbhhUTkGvpN4p Xua?dl=O. The state
petition and its supporting documents are incorporated herein and are available at:
https://www .dropbox.com/sh/zh2pknpgvuucjp0/AAA-1 xjC HxjVtO s8wvTpm9Za?dl=O.
6 See Appendix VI, Rad Survey Results.
7 See Appendix VII, emails from ELJC to the Navy.
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against Tetra Tech's former supervisor Justin Hubbard. In a March 15, 2018 letter, Laura
Duchnak, the Director of BRAC PMO, wrote of the impact of Tetra Tech's fraud:

The redevelopment of HPNS was supposed to revitalize the community and provide
jobs and
affordable housing; all of that is now on hold indefinitely as the Navy and the
regulatory
agencies have determined that TtEC's work is unreliable.

The total cost for the database evaluation, work plan preparation, and preliminary
field work is approximately $8.8M .... The EPA has indicated that it would require
all work to be reperformed as originally contracted. However, these discussions are
not final. The Navy's best estimates for required re-work costs currently range from
$1OOM to $300M.

In sum, the Navy has expended $272.8 M to date paying TtEC for their work at
HPNS, identifying the fraud, and taking measures to prevent further fraud.
Depending on the cost of required re-work, this number will certainly rise to $372.8
M and is likely to rise as high as $572.8 M. This amount of money would buy a new
Littoral Combat ship. It is nearly half of the Navy's total expenditures for all
environmental clean-up activities at HPNS through fiscal year 2017 ($991.1 M).

Mr. Hubbard's actions had far-reaching consequences for the United States, its
employees,
the City of San Francisco, the local residents, and the taxpayers. 8

Ms. Duchnak does not discuss "potential" fraud. It is actual and extensive. The
more the Navy soft-pedals the fraud, the Jess credibility it has. lfthe fraud is real enough
to have had the effect Ms. Duchnak describes, it is well past time for the Navy to drop
references to "potential" fraud.

8

See Appendix IV.
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Finally, the Navy claims credit for "discoveries made by the Navy." The Navy did
make one important discovery, it's true. Its employee flagged the low Potassium-40 (K40) data that first raised the issue of fraud. But after that, the Navy closed its "eyes" and
"ears." It made no further "discoveries." Rather, it ignored them.

In June 2016, for example, Anthony Smith, one of the whistleblowers, took the
Navy and regulators on a tour of the shipyard during which he detailed some of the
fraudulent activities he participated in. The Navy has never, to this day, spoken to him to
follow up.

More than a year before this Draft Review was released, on June 29, 2017,
Greenaction filed its NRC Petition seeking to revoke Tetra Tech's federal license,
supported by affidavits signed under penalty of perjury by numerous former radiation
workers at HPNS who have come forth to blow the whistle on Tetra Tech's fraud and the
Navy's complicity in it. They detailed six types offraud: {1) fake sampling, in which soil
samples were repotied to have been taken at one location when they were actually taken
from another; (2) samples and their analytical results were discarded because they came
back too "hot;" (3) scanning data were altered to make them appear acceptable;
(4) building survey data were fabricated; (5) radioactive material in soil was inadequately
remediated, resulting in potentially contaminated soil being used as backfill for trenches at
the Shipyard; and (6) Portal Monitor procedures were altered resulting in potentially
radioactively-contaminated soil being allowed to be shipped oftsite to points unknown. 9

Greenaction obtained sworn affidavits from Archie Jackson, Bert Bowers, Susan
Andrews, Arthur Jahr, Richard Stoney and Robert McLean, each of whom documented
improper activities. Their statements are readily available, as they are exhibits in support
of its June 2017 NRC Petition. Greenaction has repeatedly urged the Navy to interview
them. The Navy has never, to this day, done so. Sadly, Mr. Jahr has since passed away;
any untapped knowledge he may have had is now gone forever.

9

See NRC Petition, p. I.
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Greenaction also provided the Navy with two lists of additional witnesses, totaling
approximately 50 people. The Navy ignored them. To the best of our knowledge, none of
these witnesses have ever been contacted, despite more than a year's urging that the Navy
interview them.

Instead of doing what was called for- investigating the full extent of the fraud's
impact on the cleanup -the Navy allowed Tetra Tech to investigate itselj; and accepted its
self-serving and false claims the fraud was minimal and closed its eyes and ears to the
whistleblowers.

Rather than conduct a meaningful investigation, the Navy spent months and $8.8
million, according to Ms. Duchnak, on a "data review," whose purpose was not to find if
more fraud took place, but rather to statistically validate Tetra Tech's bogus data.
However, in results that were hugely surprising to the Navy but to no one else who has
followed the disastrous radiation remediation, the data review not only supported the
whistleblowers' testimony, it found much more evidence of potential fraud than even the
whistleblowers said- approximately 40%!

Even these remarkable findings underplayed the full extent ofthe evidence of
fraud. The EPA's review of precisely the same data found more than double the data
problems the Navy did. EPA's review of data from Parcel G trench units, for example,
found a whopping 97% of the data were questionable- virtually all of it.

In addition, two Tetra Tech supervisors have pled guilty to federal charges arising
from their role in the fraud and are currently serving eight-month sentences. More charges
may be forthcoming.

Despite the plethora of proof, however, the Navy continues to treat the proven
facts as mere allegations. Two years ago they were allegations. In the ensuing time those
allegations have been proven.

Forced to confront irrefutable proof dashing the Navy's hope that Tetra Tech's
data was salvageable, in December 2017 it finally announced the inevitable conclusion it
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had been seeking to avoid all along; all ofTetra Tech's data has to be thrown out. The
Navy's point man on the project, Derek Robinson, promised multiple times publicly that
all Tetra Tech's work would be redone, starting with resampling all locations where the
fraudulent firm worked.

EPA heard the same promises Greenaction members did. Here's how Lily Lee, the
EPA's HPNS Site Manager described what the Navy said in her interview for the Draft
Review: "The Navy, as the lead on cleanup, has responded through a comprehensive
radiological data evaluation, increased oversight ofongoing radiological work,
development ofplans to resample all radiological survey units on site that involved Tetra
Tech EC Inc., and increased community involvement outreach." (Italics in original,

underline added.) Similarly, as Angeles Herrera, the Assistant Director ofEPA's
Superfund Division, Federal Facility and Site Cleanup Branch, wrote in his August 14,
2018 transmittal letter ofthe EPA's comments to the Draft Parcel G Work Plan, "The
Navy has agreed to retest all of the survey units where Tetra Tech EC Inc. did previous
radiological work." (Emphasis added.)

"Resample all survey units" was what the Navy promised.

As we pointed out in our comments to the Draft Parcel G Work Plan, the Navy
has once again demonstrated that its promises are false. Rather than live up to its
promises, the Navy's draft plan only intends to resample a small percentage of survey
units. It must not be allowed to get away with reneging on its promises when it comes to
either the Parcel G Work Plan or this Draft Review: it must commit to resampling all
Tetra Tech's work.

This Draft Review, however, fails to even acknowledge the Draft Parcel G Work
Plan exists, let alone disclose the extremely limited sampling and scanning it

contemplates.

This Draft Review was published more than six months after the Navy finally
abandoned its efforts to salvage Tetra Tech's data through its data review. Yet there is
scant mention of the sequence of events leading to the status that is supposed to be
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reported in a Five-Year Review. No mention that the fraud was discovered in 2012. No
mention that Tetra Tech admitted to fraud in 2014. No mention that whistleblowers came
forward in 2016. No mention of their testimony proving widespread fraud. No mention
that the Navy believed a fraudulent firm more than whistleblowers' statements under oath.
No mention ofthe disastrous (to the Navy) results of the data review. No mention of
EPA's finding that the Navy's data review missed halfthe data problems. No mention that
the Navy has admitted all Tetra Tech's data is being thrown out. No mention ofthe
Navy's public promises to finally own up to the fraud and do what should have been clear
from the beginning; start over. No mention that the Navy's Draft Parcel G Work Plan
reneges on the Navy's multiple promises to retest all Tetra Tech's work and only test onethird of the trench units and one-half ofthe buildings.

Here is the bureaucratese the Navy employs instead, using Parcel 8-1 as an
example: "The remedies completed to date for Parcel 8-1 are protective of human health
and the environment, noting that the radiological removal actions are being retested."
Identical language is used in Section 8, Protectiveness Statement, for Parcels 8-2 C, D-2,
E, G, UC- I, UC-2 and UC-3.

These statements are false. Given that the Navy has publicly and repeatedly stated
it will no longer rely on any Tetra Tech data, there is no factual basis for claiming the
radiological remedies "completed" by Tetra Tech are "protective of human health and the
environment." This can only be true if the Navy relies on Tetra Tech's discredited datadata even the Navy now agrees, however reluctantly, is useless. As we return to in our
comments on Protectiveness Statements (see section II G below), the only accurate answer
to the question of protectiveness is "no". There are no data demonstrating protectiveness
whatsoever. Unless and until all ofTetra Tech's work is properly and comprehensively
resampled and, where necessary, re-remediated, the Navy cannot claim radiological
protectiveness.

The phrase, "noting that the radiological removal actions are being retested," does
not substitute for the Navy's duty to be factually accurate in its Statement of
Protectiveness. "Noting" that all of Tetra Tech's work must be redone is like saying that
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the Navy's oversight was exemplary, "noting that the Navy squandered more than $200
million and more than a decade."

The Navy must not be allowed to mislead the public and regulators by dismissing
the fraud's impact on the cleanup anymore.

B. ParceiA

The Drqft Review completely excludes Parcel A: "Parcel A is not discussed in this
report because the parcel required no action under CERCLA." (p.l-2).The reason Parcel A
"required no action under CERCLA" is because the Navy did an incompetent job
investigating the possibility of radiological contamination there.

Earlier this year, Greenaction brought forth both eyewitness and documentary
evidence- including sample results- proving the original Parcel A storm water and
sanitary sewer systems contained elevated levels of radionuclides that should have been
investigated but never were. Greenaction has requested that the Navy and regulators report
all information they have concerning what happened to the Parcel A sewers and their
associated soils. The sewer pipes may have been disposed of illegally; it is so far unknown
whether contaminated pipes were disposed of at facilities not licensed for radioactive
waste. Greenaction has developed information indicating the soils from the Parcel A
sewer systems were essentially "pushed over" the hill atop Parcel A into neighboring
locations as part of grading Parcel A prior to development. We have asked both EPA and
the Navy to investigate. So far as we know, both have flatly refused.

A description of an investigation of Parcel A's sewer systems and associated soils
must be added into the Draft Review.

C. Reliance on Tetra Tech Data
The Navy improperly continues to rely on Tetra Tech data for the Five-Year
Review despite already agreeing to discard it. The Index of the review lists 117 Tetra
Tech, EC Inc. documents, 91 of which are entitled either "Final" or "Final Final" status
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surveys, none of which have been made available to the public. Greenaction has requested
these documents in writing but the Navy refuses to provide them. Accordingly,
Greenaction has requested them through a Freedom of Information (FOIA) request.

There are no rational reasons the Navy should rely on or cite any ofTetra Tech's
discredited data for any purpose. The Draft Review should be scrubbed of all Tetra Tech
radiological data; all Tetra Tech documents listed in the References should be excised.

D. Investigating Soil That Was Improperly Allowed to Leave HPNS
Greenaction has provided credible evidence to the Navy that soil, improperly
scanned at Radiological Screening Yard ("RSY") pads or the Portal Monitor, or both,
resulted in a significant amount of potentially radiologically contaminated soil being
permitted to exit Hunters Point Naval Shipyard improperly. Some ofthe soil was
allegedly disposed of at landfills not licensed for low-level radioactive waste around the
San Francisco Bay Area. (See NRC Petition, pp. 22-25.)

It is incumbent on the Navy to track down that soil and take appropriate actions to
insure that unwitting people are not exposed to radioactive contamination that originated
at HPNS. The Drafi Review should include a statement that the Navy will investigate and
will publish a plan to do so that will be open to public comment.

III.

RADIOLOGICAL COMMENTS - Specific

A. Section 1- Introduction
The Introduction kicks off the litany of half-truths that litter the Navy's Draft

Revie-...v. It claims it, "identities issues found during this fourth tive-year review and
recommendations to address them."

In addition to the issues already mention in section lA above, the Draft Review
elides the Navy's own lack of oversight in permitting the fraud to take place under its nose
for years, and the regulatory agencies' failures of oversight as well. The Navy should own
up to the ugly truth, not attempt to bury it.
13

B. Section 2 -Site Background
Section 2.5.2 of the Draji Review, Future Land Uses, fails to acknowledge that
during the five-year review period the proposed use of Parcel G was changed from almost
no residential use to the entire parcel being open to residential use. Nowhere in the Draft
Review is there are discussion of how this changed use will impact the remediation. 10

C. Section 3 -Response Action Summary

The introduction to Section 3 states that Section 3, among other things, "describes
the implementation status of the selected remedy for each parcel." (p. 3-1 ). But this is
manifestly untrue when it comes to the radiological remedies.
The Draji Review provides virtually no information about the status of thereinvestigation of Tetra Tech's work. Although the Navy released a Drqft Parcel G Work
Plan in June 2018, a month before the release of the Draft Review, there is not a single
mention of it.

The information about the other parcels is just as scant. Although the Navy
announced publicly at the end of2017 that all of Tetra Tech's work would be redone, the
Draft Review says absolutely nothing about when draft work plans for the other parcels
will be released; what the resampling strategies will be; a timeline for all such actions; or
anything else.

The only thing the Drqft Review says is that "All radiological work is currently
being reviewed to determine if current site conditions are compliant with the RAOs."
(Section 3.3 .2.1, p. 3-12, for parcel B, for example). What the "review" consists of is not
addressed, as if the Navy has no idea what to do and as if it hasn't already decided exactly
what to do.

The Navy must acknowledge the truth; none of the sites Tetra Tech worked on are
compliant with the RAOs. The Navy must also abide by what it has promised publicly in
1°Feasibility Assessment for Evaluating Areas with Residential Land Use Restrictions, Parcel G,
Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, San Francisco, California, Nov. 30,2016.
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more than one forum: all Tetra Tech's data have to be thrown out and the Navy must start
over. All areas Tetra Tech worked on have to be resampled and if necessary, reremediated, as the Navy has promised.

While the Draft Review omits essential information, it includes irrelevant data as
if it were "factual." For example, the Navy congratulates itself on all the work that has
been done; in Parcel C, for example, the Navy touts all that was accomplished:
"Radiological surveys and remediation have been performed for all radiologically
impacted buildings (203, 205 and discharge tunnel, 211, 214, 224, 241, 253, 271, and
272), storm drains, and sanitary sewers, except for Buildings 211 and 253. In total, 37,572
cubic yards of soil was removed from 19,260 linear feet of sanitary sewer and storm drain
lines; approximately 987 cubic yards of soil was disposed off site as LLR W (TtEC,
20 16d)." (p. 3-18.) Similar summaries are included as to the other parcels as well.

But all that work was done by Tetra Tech. None of the work they claim to have
done can be relied on. It all has to be resampled. So why does the Navy list these actions
as if they were accomplishments? They are not. Instead, the Navy's summaries of how
much dirt was moved, how many buildings were scanned, etc., only serve to illustrate the
enormous impact of the fraud on the cleanup. What the Navy fails to say is that each and
every one ofthose "accomplishments'' are useless because Tetra Tech's data are useless.

These so-called accomplishments should be removed from the Draft Review. They
have no relevance to assuring protectiveness.

D. Section 4 - Progress Since Last Review
Failure to address the Tetra Tech fraud in this, the Draft Fourth Five-Year Review,
continues its omission in the Third Five-Year Review ("Third Review"), completed in
November 2013. The original suspicions about Tetra Tech were raised a year before, in
2012. Yet nowhere in the Third Review is there the slightest hint that Tetra Tech's data
might be fraudulent. None of the recommendations for any ofthe parcels in the Third
Review include any mention of the discovery of the fraud or what the Navy did about it
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between its discovery and the release of the Third Review. The Third Review included no
recommendations at all concerning the fraud the Navy already knew about.

In Parcel D-2, for example, the Third Five-Year Review omitted a protectiveness
statement "because the parcel was deemed to require no further action following
completion of radiological remediation." (4.5, p. 4-3). But all Tetra Tech's data should
have been suspect in 2012, calling into question the "completion of radiological
remediation.''

When it comes to the radiological fraud, the Navy played "hide the ball" in 2013
and obviously intends no change now. The Navy must be required to tell the whole truth
about the radiological disaster it allowed to happen. It must not be allowed to dodge the
truth or its responsibility any longer.

E. Section 5 - Five-Year Review Process
Section 5.2, Document and Data Review, states, "As part of this tive-year review,
documents and data related to remedy implementation were reviewed for each parcel. The
reviews primarily focused on (1) documents and data that provide information on the
technical and regulatory considerations that led to remedy selection and implementation,
(2) documents that demonstrate remedy completion, and (3) documents and parcelspecific data that demonstrate the remedies continue to be protective of human health and
the environment." (p. 5-2.)

This is a microcosm of all that is wrong with the Navy's approach to the postTetra Tech period. The Navy admits it doesn't take a dispassionate, objective view. It
focuses on "documents that demonstrate remedy completion." It should be focusing on all
relevant documents and data, whether they demonstrate compliance or not, especially if
not.

And, when it comes to Tetra Tech's work, ''parcel-specific data that demonstrate
the remedies continue to be protective" are non-existent. It's all unreliable. None can
demonstrate protectiveness or anything else.
16

Furthermore, the Fourth Five Year Review fails to look forward. It must
discuss the need to amend all the existing RODs as they relate to radiological
contamination, and Parcels E and E-2 for chemical contaminants. The current five
year review process is the appropriate place to discuss the need for ROD amendments
to account for new circumstances.

In fact, the Navy has done precisely that in the past. For example, it discussed
the possibility of an amendment to the Parcel B ROD in the First Five Year Review:
"The future RA process for Parcel 8 could include a technical memorandum in
support of a ROD amendment, a proposed plan (with community involvement), a
ROD amendment, RD, and RA, followed by closeout activities." The Parcel B ROD
was eventually amended, in part because of the recommendation made in the first
review:

In 2007-2008, the Navy prepared two technical memoranda ... in support of
amending the ROD as recommended by the First 5-year review. These memoranda
provided the technical foundation for identification of revised remedial alternatives
and preparation of a proposed plan and subsequent amended ROD for Parcel B.
(Second Five Year Review at 3.5.8).

The Drafi Review should provide recommendations for the steps to be taken in
the coming five years, informed by which new information that was not considered
when the RODs were approved.

F. Section 6- Technical Assessment

The Draft Review is internally inconsistent. For example, Section 6 states,
"Published documents report the completion of radiological surveys and remediation in
IR-07/18 and Parcels B-1, B-2, C, D-1, D-2, E, G, UC-1, UC-2, and UC-3." (p. 6-6.)
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Section 6.1.6, Radiological Surveys and Remediation, asks, "Are the

radiological surveys and remediation remedies implemented in IR-07118 and Parcels B-1,
B-2, C, D-1, D-2. E, G, UC-1, UC-2, and UC-3functioning as intended by the decision
documents? YES (for IR-07/18 and Parcel D-1); NO (for Parcels B-1, B-2, C, D-2, E, G,
UC-1, UC-2, and UC-3).P. 6-6).

Again, the Navy cannot claim that remediation has been "completed" but in the
next breath admit, "Well, not really." Having determined under public pressure and the
insistence of the EPA that all Tetra Tech data are unreliable, the Navy must drop any
pretense that radiological work was "completed.'' The Draft Review should consistently
say that none of Tetra Tech's work was "completed" and that the remedies it implemented
are not protective.

As stated above, The Navy downplays the fraud throughout, including in Section
6. For example, it states, "In January 2018, the Navy determined that a significant portion
of the radiological survey and remediation work completed to date was compromised by
potential manipulation and/or falsification of data by one of its radiological remediation
contractors. Compromised data were identified in reports associated with Parcels B-1, B2, C, D-2, E, G, UC-1, UC-2, and UC-3. Again, this is an understatement. "A significant
portion'' of Tetra Tech's data was not compromised; all of it was. And characterizing the
fraud as "potential'' is belied by the facts, including those provided by BRAC's boss. It is
past time for the Navy to stop denying that the fraud actually took place.

In Section 6.2.3, Changes in Risk Assessment Methods, the Navy claims it can
substitute a 2014 EPA supplemental guidance in place of the risk assessment and, without
proof, further claims equivalency: "Use of these updated default exposure parameters in
place of the original values used in the risk assessments for each ofthe parcels primarily
results in increasing the RBCs for the adult receptors. The increase is not significantly
different from the values estimated in the original risk assessments. As such, EPA changes
to default exposure parameters do not affect the protectiveness of the remedies." (p. 6-12.)
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However, as the EPA made quite clear in its comments to the Drafi Parcel G

Work Plan, this substitution is improper; it impermissibly changes the ROD:

At this stage of the CERCLA process, the cleanup goals have already been
legally established. A new Radiation Risk Assessment is ordinarily only
performed as part of a Five-Year Review to evaluate whether or not the original
RG's are still protective. EPA has separately recommended that the Navy
conduct this review, and, if any ofthe RGs are found to be no longer protective
using the most current risk calculators, propose amendments to the Parcel G
ROD to ensure protectiveness. For the current work plan, however, the current
RGs still govern the cleanup and if any material is found on Parcel G that
exceeds the RGs established in the Parcel G ROD for the ROCs, excluding
naturally occurring and anthropogenic background, the material should be
removed and disposed of in accordance with the ROD and other applicable laws
and regulations. (p.3.)
On the other hand, Greenaction would welcome it if the Navy did formally what it
is attempting to do by sleight of hand- reopen the ROD to include newer, more protective
standards. We urge the Navy to accept EPA's suggestion that as part ofthe five-year
review, it formally reassess the standards set in the nine-year-old ROD to make them more
protective.

G. Section 7- Issues Recommendations and Other Findings
The Draft Review claims in Section 7 that, "It is anticipated that the radiological
rework will span 5 years and be completed prior to the next tive-year review.'' (p. 7-2.)
This is yet another example of the Navy's wishful thinking. Consider that: the Navy
claims it can redo more than a decade's work by Tetra Tech in less than half that time; to
date the Navy still has not obtained an approved work plan for even a single parcel that
needs to be reworked, nine months after the Navy finally acknowledged it would be
necessary; and the Navy includes no timeline whatsoever detailing what activities will
take place or when. Finally, consider this statement from Ms. Duchnak's victim impact
statement: "The Navy estimates that the fraud committed by Mr. Hubbard and others has
set back the planned transfer of HPNS property to the City by an approximate decade.''

The Navy needs to stop stating hope as fact. It cannot claim in the Draft Review
that the project will be delayed five years, when BRAC's boss says it will be double that.
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It is this kind oftransparently false optimism that continues to taint the Navy's relations
with the community.

Section 7 also states that the "Navy has determined that a significant portion'' of
Tetra Tech's data was compromised. (p. 7-2.) As mentioned before, this is, at best, an
understatement. All of Tetra Tech's data are compromised. The Navy admitted that
publicly more than nine months ago. The Drqft Review must say that clearly and without
evasion.

H. Section 8 - Protectiveness Statement
The Drqft Review repeats the following uninformative statement it makes as to
Parcel B-1: "The remedies completed to date for Parcel B-1 are protective of human
health and the environment, noting that the radiological removal actions are being
retested.'' (p. 8.1.) The identical language is used in reference to Parcels B-2, C, G, UC-1,
UC-2 and UC-3. (pp. 8-1 through 8-4.)

The Five-Year Review must be factual. It must start by admitting the radiological
remedies in those parcels are not currently protective. This is the inevitable conclusion of
the EPA's critique ofthe Navy's data review. And it must acknowledge that the
"radiological removal actions" will be retested, not that they "are being retested." The
Navy has not obtained regulatory approval for any retesting yet. And if the Navy refuses
to accede to the EPA suggestions in its comments to the Drqji Parcel G Work Plan, any
retesting may have to await completion of the FFA's mandated dispute resolution process,
further delaying when the Navy can truthfully claim the parcels "are being retested." As
stated above, the revised Drqft Review should describe the radiological work the Navy
intends to do in response to the fraud in each parcel, along with a time line of activities.

The protectiveness statements for Parcels 0-1 and 0-2 are equally dishonest. The

Drqft Review says the remedy for 0-1 "is expected to be protective." (p. 8-3.) Of course,
the Navy has "expected'' a lot that did not tum out to be true. It expected Tetra Tech to do
a proper job. It expected that it had the capacity to adequately supervise Tetra Tech. It
expected to obtain free clearance in multiple parcels by now. Regulators and the public
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have no reason to believe that the Navy will meet its expectations- it has not so far and, if
the Drqfi Parcel G Work Plan and the Drqfi Review are any indication, the Navy has
learned nothing from the Tetra Tech fraud and will blithely continue as it has done so far.

As to Parcel D-2, the Navy follows the template it used in Section 3; cite all the
"work" it has done and then add the non sequitor, "Radiological surveys and removal
actions completed in Parcel D-2 were potentially compromised, and corrective actions are
required to determine if the RAOs have been achieved." It does not matter how many
cubic yards of soil remediation were fraudulently "completed," though it is instructive of
the impact of the Navy allowing the fraud to take place over so many years.

I. Figures
Figures 3 through 13 are inaccurate. Each purports to show an ''Overview of
Remedy Components,'' for a specific parcel. Yet none includes radiological components;
none ofthe figure's "legends" even reference radioactivity.

The Navy knows where Tetra Tech (as well as other radiological contractors)
worked and can include such information. For example, the sewer systems have been
identified as major radiological remediation sites. The Navy can and should include
anticipated radiological work either in these figures or create separate radiological
overviews of remedy components.

IV.

NON-RADIOLOGICAL

A. The Draft Review Must Evaluate Protectiveness Consistent with Up-to
Date, Scientific Sea and Bay-Level Rise Projections
The Draft Review surprisingly and unacceptably fails to consider essential new
data that was not available when the remedies were selected. The most important
missing data are the latest scientific projections of sea-level rise. Because of the
intense toxicity of the hazardous and radioactive wastes (including residue from
atomic bomb testing) that current remedies leave capped onsite, and the persistence of

21

that toxicity, the Navy courts long-term disaster if its Bay-level rise assumptions are
wrong. The Draft Review must not only evaluate protectiveness in light of estimates of
Bay-level rise in the coming decades, but its threat from Bay-level rise centuries into
the future as well. If the Navy is wrong now and global warming causes the Bay to
rise enough to overwhelm current remedies, the health of nearby residents, subsistence
fishers, people recreating on the proposed "open space" and the hundreds of thousands
of people living along the San Francisco Bay will all be at unacceptable risk.

State of California governmental agencies have done extensive research,
analysis and reporting on the latest projections for rising sea levels - yet the Draft
Review appears to have ignored this important science.

The San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC)
is a planning and regulatory agency with regional authority over San Francisco Bay,
the Bay's shoreline band, and the Suisun Marsh. BCDC was created in 1965 and is the
nation's oldest coastal zone regulatory agency. Its mission is to protect and enhance
San Francisco Bay and to encourage the Bay's responsible and productive use for this
and future generations. BCDC leads the Bay Area's ongoing multi-agency regional
effort to address the impacts of rising sea level on shoreline communities and assets.

BCDC's Adapting to Rising Tides project (ART)
(http://www.adaptingtorisingtides.org/) started in 2010 when BCDC and NOAA's
Office for Coastal Management brought together local, regional, state and federal
agencies and organizations as well as non-profit and private associations for a
collaborative planning project along the Alameda County shoreline. The project
worked to identify how anticipated current and future flooding associated with global
warming will affect communities, infrastructure, ecosystems and the economy.

Since then, the ART has continued to both lead and support multi-sector and
cross-jurisdictional projects that build both local and regional capacity in the Bay Area
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to plan for and implement adaptation. These efforts have enabled ART to test and
refine adaptation planning methods (ART Approach) to integrate sustainability and
transparent decision-making from start to finish, and foster robust collaborations that
lead to action on adaptation. BCDC has conducted extensive scientific research. Its sea
level rise projections and mapping are widely accepted as sound by government
agencies. Adapting to Rising Tides Bay Area Sea Level Rise Analysis and Mapping
Project has the latest data that the Navy must use in development of revised remedies
to continue to assure protectiveness into the future. 11

The State of California Ocean Protection Council's (OPC) 2018 State of
California Sea Level Rise Guidance is also vitally important to consider in developing

safe remedies. 12

The 2018 update of the Guidance was created by the OPC, California Natural
Resources Agency, Governor's Office of Planning and Research, and the California
Energy Commission. The Guidance provides the best available data on sea level rise
projections for California which should be used by state agencies and local
governments in their planning, permitting, and investment decisions.

The Remediation Design for Parcel E-2 is deficient given updated sea level
rise projections. In Section 6.3 (Technical Assessment Question C, pp. 6-15), the Draft
Review states:

The estimated sea-level rise in San Francisco under three future greenhouse
gas emission scenarios (referred to as representative concentration pathways
[RCPs]) is summarized below:
• RCP 8.5 is consistent with a future in which there are no significant
global efforts to limit or reduce emissions. In 2100, the likely sea-level
rise associated with this scenario ranges from 1.6 to 3.4 feet.

11 See http://www.adaptingtorisingtides.org/project/regional-sea-Ievel-rise-mapping-and-shorelineanalysis/) and http://www.adaptingtorisingtides.org/wp-content/uploads/20 18/07/BAT A-ART-SLRAnalysis-and-Mapping-Report-Final-20 170908.pdf
12 http://www.opc.ca.gov/webmaster/ftp/pdf/agenda_items/20 180314/Item3 _ExhibitA_OPC_SLR_Guidance-rd3.pdf
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•

RCP 4.5 is a moderate emissions reduction scenario and assumes that
global greenhouse gas emissions will be curtailed. In 2100, the likely sealevel rise associated with this scenario ranges from 1.2 to 2. 7 feet.
• RCP 2.6 is a stringent emissions reduction scenario and assumes that
global greenhouse gas emissions will be significantly curtailed. In 2100,
the likely sea-level rise associated with this scenario ranges from 1.0 to
2.4 feet.
Based on the information above, a contingency of up to a 3-foot increase in
sea level was considered in designing the crest elevation for Parcels E and E2.
No other information has been identified to suggest that the remedies may not
be protective of human health or the environment. (p. 6-15.)
The assumption greenhouse gas emissions will curtail is speculative at best,
and should not be used as a guideline in remediation planning. This is especially true
with the current EPA's efforts to abandon stringent greenhouse gas and other
emissions limits from coal fired power plants and other industries.

BCDC's "Adapting to Rising Tides Bay Area Sea Level Rise Analysis and
Mapping Project" outlines a range oflikely sea level rise scenarios (see Appendix Ill,
p. 13). The upper bound of these scenarios is 5.5 feet (66 inches) sea level rise by the
year 2100. Adapting to Rising Tides also considers a 100-year extreme tide (see
appendix Ill, p. 15), which is the coastal water level elevation that has a 1 percent
chance of occurring in any given year. A 5.5 feet (66 inches) sea level rise with the
100-year extreme tide would create a tide 9 feet (108 inches) above Mean Higher High
Water (MHHW, the average of the high water mark of each tidal day observed over
the National Tidal Datum Epoch).

Even minimal risk of catastrophic events must be considered and planned for
due to the dangerous radioactive and contamination in close proximity to people and
the Bay.

According to the 2018 State of California Sea-Level Rise Guidance (Appendix
II, p. 57):
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•

Sea level rise will reach 5.7 to 6.9 feet by 2100 under the medium to high
risk aversion scenario.

•

Sea level rise will reach 10.2 feet by 2100 under the H++ scenario (detailed
below).

The 2018 State of California Sea-Level Rise Guidance suggests that projects
with a lifespan beyond 2050, that have a low-tolerance for risk (i.e., hazardous waste
& toxic storage sites) should use H++ scenario. H++ scenarios can be considered the

"worst-case" possibility and describe an extreme sea level rise scenario that would
result from a catastrophic event (i.e., the collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet),
especially under high emission scenarios. The projected sea level rise under the H++
scenario is 10.2 feet by 2100.

The projections used by the Draft Review are inadequate because they do not
consider the most up to date sea level rise projections or consider a future in which
emissions will increase. The State of California Sea Level Rise Guidance 2018 Update
has estimated the chance of sea level rise meeting or exceeding various heights in
various years (see Appendix I, p. 58). It estimates these percentages under two
scenarios: one in a future with low carbon emissions and one in a future with high
carbon emissions. The likeliness of sea level rise exceeding 3 feet by 21 00 under a
future with low emissions is 7%. The likeliness of sea level rise to exceed 3 feet by
2100 with high future emissions is 28%. So, the current design has a 7-28% chance of
failure due to sea level rise by 2100, depending on the future carbon emissions. This
risk is unacceptable.

The risk of flooding and inundation is especially important for Parcel E-2,
due to its history of disposal of hazardous and radioactive waste. According
to Adapting to Rising Tides, Sea level rise and storm events may cause
flooding or groundwater intrusion to contaminated sites and landfill waste
containment systems. Temporary or permanent surface flooding, erosive tidal
or wave energy, and elevated groundwater levels could cause the release of
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hazardous substances with potentially significant consequences on public
health, the environment, and the local economy. 13
The release of any amount of toxic or radioactive substances in Hunters Point
would be detrimental because the community is already disproportionately burdened
by a multitude of environmental hazards, and would have a significant negative impact
on the entire Bay ecosystem.

Both BCDC and the State of California Sea-Level Rise Guidance project sea
level rise to surpass the 3-foot mark accounted for in the Navy's design
considerations. Three feet above mean sea level is generally considered in the middle
ofthe likely range of sea level rise by 2100. When planning for construction in an area
that is as dangerous when flooded as Parcels E and E2 with all the toxic waste they
contain, the upper bound of all sea level rise scenarios should be used, which
according to BCDC is 9 feet and according to State of California Sea-Level Rise
Guidance is 10.2 feet.

Accordingly, the remedies that could be affected by sea-level rise significantly
higher than the unreasonably low assumptions made by the Navy must be
reconsidered in this review.

A. Potential Flooding of the Revetment Wall Must Be Considered

As depicted in the Engineering/Remediation Resources Group, Inc.'s Shoreline
Revetment Detail the highest point of the design is the concrete sea wall, standing at
approximately 7 feet above mean sea level. This height is insufficient in light of
current updated scientific sea level rise projections referenced above. Combined with
the possibility of high tides, king tides, storm surges, wind driven waves and El Nino,
all of the sea level rise possibilities outlined in the previous section indicate there is a
strong likelihood of the currently designed sea wall flooding.
13 SF BCDC Adapting to Rising Tides. "Contaminated Lands", p. 1.
http://www.adaptingtorisingtides.org/portfolio/contaminated-lands/
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Remedial design should reflect the possibility which would most effectively protect
the residents of Bayview Hunters Point. Considering the catastrophic health hazards
which could result from Parcel E-2 flooding, the H++ scenario should be used,
accounting for sea level rise of 10.2 feet by 2100. In conclusion, the construction of a
revetment sea wall at 7 foot is inadequate, and will likely expose additional
contaminants to a community and San Francisco Bay that are already overburdened
with multiple environmental hazards.

B. Concerns about Slurry Wall Construction

The Draft Review does not address the effect of sea level rise on slurry walls.
As sea levels rise, the levels of ground water tables rise as well. Nor does it account
for how the rise of groundwater will affect the integrity of the slurry walls. The design
process seems to be using current groundwater levels, but not planning for new
levels/flow directions/pressures. The effective life cycle of these slurry walls is not
addressed, and if it is more than 10-15 years, which it well should be, these sea level
rise outcomes should be a major design consideration. This also of course impacts the
"remedy" of leaving contamination buried at the waterfront.

Constructing a slurry wall on fractured bedrock is a poorly engineered idea
which fails to provide a long term solution. While the review indicates that the land is
not an aquifer due to its limited flow capability, ineffectiveness remains. Regardless of
the depth of the slurry wall, water will percolate through the cracks of the bedrock on
which the slurry wall sits. This will enable the interaction of the contaminated landfill
groundwater with both the San Francisco Bay water and surrounding uncontaminated
groundwater.

The Draft Review additionally fails to address any seismic activity that may
occur, which could both destroy the slurry wall and potentially further fracture the
bedrock. This should be a major concern as San Francisco is right on the San Andreas
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Fault and, is highly susceptible to major, potentially catastrophic earthquakes like the
one on April18, 1906.

The Navy's reliance on below-ground barriers and capping of contaminated
soil with a few feet of barriers are not safe or sustainable remedies for the extremely
contaminated land ofParcel-E and E 2. In particular, caps are extremely vulnerable to
flooding with increased water levels caused by sea level rise.

C. The Slurry Wall Will Not Stop Rising Groundwater Inundation
of Contamination
Increased water levels in the Bay and storm surges are not the only flooding
and inundation threat to the "remedy" of leaving buried contaminated waste so close
to the Bay. As sea levels rise, so will groundwater.

A study by the US Geological Survey and Yale University states "... as sea
level rises, so will groundwater levels, and since underground infrastructure including sewer pipes and utility equipment- was built with historical groundwater
levels in mind, this could lead to expensive headaches for coastal communities." 14

A slurry wall and capping on top of contamination will do nothing to prevent
rising groundwater from inundating and potentially flooding the area, resulting in an
environmental and health disaster.

D. The Vulnerability of Bayview Hunters Point Residents to
Pollution Must Be Factored Into the Review
The Navy's remediation of the Shipyard Superfund Site must continue to be
protective of health and the environment. It must be based on science and take into
account the current reality of the health crisis and environmental conditions at and

14

http://www.climatecentral.org/blogs/sea-level-rise-may-raise-groundwater-levels
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near the site, including Bayview Hunters Point, and how potential failure of remedies
at the shipyard could significantly exacerbate them.
Unfortunately, the approved remedies do not take into consideration the welldocumented health vulnerabilities of residents. Remedies must be based on facts, not
on abstract "health" levels that are not appropriate for Bayview Hunters Point.

It is a well-established fact that Bayview Hunters Point is heavily impacted by

decades of pollution from industry and the military, as well as from two freeways, the
City's main sewage treatment plant, dozens of contamination sites, freight transport,
the Port of San Francisco, and under-regulated and unregulated businesses operating
with little or no government oversight.

In January 2017, the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment
(OEHHA), on behalf of the California Environmental Protection Agency (CalEPA),
released Version 3.0 ofthe California Communities Environmental Health Screening
Tool (CalEnviroScreen). CalEnviroScreen identifies California communities by
census tract that are disproportionately burdened by, and vulnerable to, multiple
sources of pollution. CalEnviroScreen measures vulnerability through evaluating and
quantifying pollution exposures, environmental effects, sensitive populations and
socioeconomic factors.

CalEnviroScreen 3.0 found that BVHP is one ofthe communities in the entire
state most at risk from pollution, and concluded that it has a higher pollution burden
than 90% of the state.

CalEnviroScreen 3.0, quantifies this community's significant exposure to
environmental hazards, ranking it in the 99th percentile for diesel Particulate Matter,
98th percentile for groundwater threats, and 86th percentile for hazardous waste. It
found BVHP to be in the 98th percentile for asthma.
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Based on the facts regarding these significant and alarming vulnerabilities, the
remedies set forth in the various RODs must be re-evaluated and new, more protective
remedies adopted. The appropriate health protective remedies will require an
expanded, comprehensive and safe cleanup and removal of as much of the hazardous
and radioactive waste as possible from the site - not merely capping waste in place.
Leaving radioactive and hazardous wastes buried at the Superfund Site, next to
existing and proposed neighborhoods, under what is proposed to be recreational "open
space," and next to the San Francisco Bay waterfront threatened by rising sea levelsprojected to be as more than 5 feet by 2100 under "moderate" assumptions and
climbing even higher in future centuries - is purely reckless and unacceptable.

E. The Entire Shipyard Superfund Site and Adjacent Areas Must
Be Comprehensively Retested, With Independent Community
Oversight
The Navy must carry through with its public commitment to properly retest all
areas, not just some areas, where Tetra Tech did radiological work at the Shipyard.
The Navy and other government agencies must test the entire Shipyard Site and
adjacent areas, including any locations that information provided by whistleblowers,
residents and other reliable sources indicate may have been contaminated from
Shipyard operations.

Scanning is insufficient and unacceptable if not combined with comprehensive
core sampling. Testing must be thorough and comprehensive:
a. Radiological core sampling must be conducted of the entire site and
adjacent areas. It is imperative that all core samples go at least 9 feet beneath
the surface, .
b. The core sampling should create a 2m x 2m mapping grid,
c. All core sampling must follow split sampling protocols.
d. All ground water should be tested for radiation contamination, including
aquifers A and B,
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e. The Navy must immediately begin working with the State of California
and the Bay Area Air Quality Management District to develop and implement
standards for fugitive radiological dust, and
f. Radiologically contaminated soil should be marked with an orange colored
dye. Applying this would explicitly identify important areas, help prevent
accidental shipments of radioactive soil to landfills, and act as a dust
suppression measure.

F. Land Use
Simply stated. kids and other residents should not live, work or play next to or
on top of hazardous and radioactive waste. The effect of a botched and inadequate
cleanup reverberate far beyond the shipyard, impacting nearby San Francisco
neighborhoods, the Bay itself and all who enjoy it and rely upon it, including
subsistence fishers, and communities along the Bay.

We call on the Navy and regulatory agencies to reconsider the RODs, as part
of this five-year review, to incorporate newer and more protective cleanup standards
and a comprehensive remediation.

B. CONCLUSION
The widespread fraud and botched cleanup, the lack of proper regulatory
oversight, the lack of transparency and the government's inappropriate relationship
with mega-developer Lennar/Five Points have undermined a proper cleanup of the
contamination and resulted in the reckless and unscientific "remedies" being evaluated
in the Draft Review. This is the time and process to re-evaluate the "remedies" because
they:
•

are not protective of public health or the environment,
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•

do not take into account the fact that Bayview Hunters Point residents have
been found by the State of California to be highly at risk and vulnerable to
pollution due to health, environmental and socio-economic indicators,

•

endanger San Francisco Bay,

•

are based in significant part on "data" produced by Tetra Tech despite the
widespread fraud committed by that company during years of "remediation"
work at the Superfund site,

•

are not based on the pending large scale retesting of much of the Superfund
Site which has not yet begun, and

•

do not reflect latest scientific consensus on expected sea level rise due to
climate change.

Our comments highlight serious flaws and omissions in the Navy's review that
must be corrected. These flaws include, among others, inadequate consideration of the
impact ofthe radiological fraud on the cleanup and outdated assumptions which will
particularly impact the large amounts of hazardous and radioactive waste buried at
Parcel E-2; the Draft Review's remedy analysis fails to adequately address rising sea
levels due to climate change which threaten San Francisco Bay and its waterfront. The
threat that rising Bay levels could inundate portions of the shipyard including Parcel
E-2, as well as an inadequate revetment design that will not provide adequate
protection from contaminants reaching the Bay are real and must be addressed.

The ROD remedies that are subject to the five-year review must be revised as
part of this review process to incorporate the entirely foreseeable effects of significant
new information, not available when the RODs were adopted. This includes the
impact of the radiological fraud and the substantial and growing threat that Bay-level
rise presents to the future integrity of remedies selected years ago.

We have already seen the consequences of the Navy's failure to anticipate
foreseeable risks. In August 2000, local residents observed strange-colored smoke
from what appeared to be a fire burning underground in Parcel E-2. This subsurface
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fire burned for months, with plumes of smoke readily visible to affected residents,
some of whom report adverse respiratory affects. The smoke also affected shipyard
workers and the police personnel based there. The Navy failed to properly inform the
public about the health risks for the better part of three weeks after the fire broke out. 15
That an underground chemical fire erupted and burned for months in a supposedly
stable capped "remedy" highlights the risks to protectiveness from leaving highly
toxic waste buried on site.

The Navy must plan for- not underplay- predictable risks such as those posed
by global warming, especially at Parcel E-2, where buried contamination is extensive
and will continue to be toxic far into the future. If the Navy gets it wrong as a result of
its refusal to factor up-to-date science into the five-year review, it could unleash a
catastrophe to the public health and the environment. As more and more data on sealevel and Bay-level rise emerges, the Navy must reconsider and conclude that the
buried hazardous and radioactive waste at Parcel E 2 needs to be removed from
proximity to residents and the rising Bay.

The Draft Five-Year Review needs to be redone to incorporate up-to-date
science and public health data. Common sense and environmental justice require that
remedies be revisited as part of the five-year review and revised remedies must
prioritize removal of any and all hazardous and radioactive waste and contamination
from the site.

15 Navy Owns Up to Monthlong Toxic Fire at Hunters Point, SFGate, Sept. 11, 2000,
https:/lwww.sfgate.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/Navy-Owns-Up-to-Monthlong-Toxic-Fire-atHunters-2739820.php
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Appendices

Appendix I.

Probability that Sea-Level Rise will meet or exceed a particular

height (in feet) in San Francisco (State of California Sea-Level Rise Guidance
2018 Update, p. 58)
The chart below displays the chances sea level rise will meet or exceed a certain
height by the year listed.
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Appendix II. Projected Sea-Level Rise (in feet) for San Francisco (State of
California Sea-Level Rise Guidance, p. 57)
The chart below portrays the probabilistic projections for sea-level rise height, along
with the H++ scenario (shown in the far right, blue column), as seen in the Rising Seas
Report.
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Appendix Ill. San Francisco Sea Level Rise Scenarios (Bay Conservation and
Development Commission's Adapting to Rising Tides Bay Area Sea Level Rise
Analysis and Mapping Project, Final Report 2017, Pages 13-15)
The firs t six scenarios (12 , 24 , 36 , 48, 52, and 66 inches of SLR above MHHW) relate directly to the NRC
SLR estimates, and they capture a broad range of scenarios between the most-likely scenario and the
high end of the uncertainty range at both mid-cen tury and the end of the century:
1. 12-inch SLR::; 2050 most-likely SLR scenario
2. 24-inch SLR = 2050 high end of the range ; or an existing 5-year extreme tide
3. 36-inch SLR = 2100 most-likely SLR scenario ; or an existing 50-year extreme tide
4. 48-inch SLR ::::: 2100 upper 85 percen t confidence in terval ; or 6 inches of SLR plus a 100-year
extreme tide
5. 52-inch SLR ::; 12-inch SLR plus 100-year extreme tide
6. 66-inch SLR = 2100 upper-end SLR scenario; or 24 -i nch SLR plus 100-year extreme tide
Inundation maps were also created for Bay water level elevations of 77, 84 , 96, and 108 inches above
MHHW . These levels are above curren t predictions fo r SLR likely to occur by 2100, bu t they are helpful in
illustrating short-term flood ing that cou ld occur when extreme tides are coup led with SLR :
7.
8.
9.
10.

77 inches above MHHW::::: 36-inch SLR plus 100-year extreme tide
84 inches above MHHW::: 48-inch SLR plus 50-yea r extreme tide
96 inches above MHHW : : : 66-inch SLR plus 25-yea r extreme tide
108 inches above MHHW : : : 66-inch SLR plus 100-year extreme tide
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0

12

19

23

MHHW+ 6"

6

18

25

29

MHHW + 12"

12

24

31

Existing Conditions

27

32

36

41

33

47

39

53

37

77

73
MHHW + 60"

77

78

81
87

72

85

36

89

93

78

83

80

84

89

84

88

93

APPENDIX IV

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE
33000 NIXIE WAY, BLDG 50 STE 207
SAN DIEGO, CA 92147

5820
Ser BPM0/003
March 15, 2018
The Honorable James Donato
United States District Court
Northern District of California
Federal Building and Courthouse
450 Golden Gate Avenue
San Francisco, California
Dear Judge Donato:
SUBJECT:

VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT IN THE MATTER OF U.S. V. HUBBARD

The Department of the Navy has been designated a crime victim under 18 U.S.C. § 3771 as
a result of the fraud committed by Mr. Hubbard, a former employee of Tetra Tech EC Inc. (Tt
EC), and others. The Navy contracted Tt EC to prepare planning documents, investigate
radiological contamination, conduct remediation, dispose of radioactive waste, and document
their activities to support closure of radiologically-impacted sites and buildings at Hunters Point
. Naval Shipyard (HPNS) from 2003 to 2014. These activities were necessary prior to the Navy
turning HPNS over to the City of San Francisco for redevelopment. The fraud committed by Mr.
Hubbard and other Tt EC employees has caused not only a substantial financial loss to the Navy,
but harm to the Navy's reputation, and it has cost the Navy substantial resources and time. The
purpose of this statement is to give the Court a sense of the magnitude of the negative impact of
this fraudulent conduct and how it has made the accomplishment ofboth the Navy's and the
City's goals more difficult. Because of the widespread and continuing harm that he has caused
the Navy, we ask that you award Mr. Hubbard a substantial sentence.
While the fraud committed by Mr. Hubbard and others has caused the Navy concrete and
measurable monetary loss (addressed below), this fi:aud has also caused significant harm to the
Navy that is much more difficult to quantify - but very real. The fraud and uncertainty
surrounding Tt EC's work at HPNS has caused a complete loss of trust in the Navy by the local
community. The new residents at HPNS are understandably anxious for their safety, and this has
required additional effort by the Navy and regulators to address these concerns. The transfer of
the property to the City will be delayed by many years, and the Navy has had to address the ire
and frustration of the Mayor's Office, the Supervisor's Office, and local Congressional staffs.
The redevelopment ofHPNS was supposed to revitalize the community and provide jobs and
affordable housing; all of that is now on hold indefinitely as the Navy and the regulatory
agencies have determined that Tt EC's work is unreliable. The frustrations of these local
constituencies have been channeled into a stmng activist element which has made the Navy's
public meetings tense, aggressive and explosive.
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The fraud committed by Mr. Hubbard and others has also led to negative national media
attention. The effort to respond to this negative media attention has required increased staffing
to answer questions, prepare for interviews, and conduct risk communication training - all of
which pulled Navy staffaway from their primary duties and caused collateral impacts to other
Navy bases and projects.
In addition to responding to the media, correcting misinformation, and responding to the
concerns of the public and politicians, the Navy's Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Office
created a special Review Team to assess the fraud allegations; determine what level of additional
site investigation was needed, perform sampling, and then incorporate these findings into a new
Work Plan for HPNS. These activities diverted significant numbers of BRAC employees from
their nc;nmal duties, causing additional disruption to numerous other Navy projects across the
country. This diversion of personnel and resources resulted in delays and increased costs for
these other projects and resulted in constant stress on the Navy staff over a sustained period of
time. The efforts of the Review Team and other similar efforts (including legal and contract
dispute efforts, technical re-calculations, political briefings to the City and Congressional
delegations, and constant con.:nnullication up and down the Navy chain of Commartd); has cost
Navy personnel hundreds if not thousands of hours of additional work. The Navy estimates that
the fraud committed by Mr. Hubbard and others has set back the planned transfer ofHPNS
property to the City by an approximate decade. This means not only lost development
opportunities for the City and the local community, but continued cost to the Navy to hold and
maintain the property.
The fraud has also caused a loss of confidence by the regulatory community (both EPA and.
California State regulators) regarding the Navy's radiological remediation program and the
Navy's competence to implement it. The EPA has expressed to the Navy that they no longer
have confidence in the work perfmmed by Tt EC at HPNS; as well as at other Navy radiological
sites including those located at Treasure Island and Alameda in the San Francisco Bay Area.
The Navy now faces an uphill struggle to rehabilitate itself from this negative connotation in the
regulatory community. It will take years to rebuild this credibility.
·
As I indicated above, the negative fiscal impact to the Navy of the fraud committed by Mr.
Hubbard and others at HPNS is consequential, and continues to be assessed. The Navy awarded
sixteen contract task orders to address radiological work at HPNS to Tt EC. To date, the Navy
has paid TtEC $261.8M for work performed at HPNS. Due to the uncovered fraud, all of this
work has been called into question and may need to be re-performed. After discovering evidence
of Tt EC data falsification/manipulation, and becoming aware of allegations from former. Tt EC
employees/subcontractors, the Navy hired an independent contractor (Battelle) to provide daily
onsite radiological quality assurance for all Navy contractors performing radiological work at
HPNS. This cost approximately $2.2M. The Navy also hired CH2MHill to re-evaluate the work
performed and documented by Tt EC at HPNS, CH2MHill reviewed Tt EC's radiological
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database for buildings and soil sites for falsification/manipulation using a variety of statistical
and logic tests. This analysis provided evidence of previously-undiscovered data falsification
and manipulation, which prompted the Navy to begin preparing work plans for an independent
analysis of the worksite. The total cost for the database evaluation, work plan preparation, and
preliminary field work is approximately $8.8M. The Navy is currently working with federal and
state regulatory agencies to determine the extent of rework that will be necessary at HPNS in
order for the Navy to obtain the required "free release" from the regulatory agencies to turn the
property over to the City. The EPA has indicated that it would require all work to be reperformed as originally contracted. However, these discussions are not final. The Navy's best
estimates for required re-work costs currently range from $1OOM to $3OOM.
In sum, the Navy has expended $272.8 M to date paying Tt EC for their work at HPNS,
identifying the fraud, and taking measures to prevent further fraud. Depending on the cost of
required re-work, this number will certainly rise to $372.8 M and is likely to rise as high as
$572.8 M. This amount of money would buy a new Littoral Combat ship. It is nearly half of the
Navy's total expenditures for all environmental clean-up activities at HPNS through fiscal year
2017 ($991.1 M). This is money that could otherwise have been used by the Navy to u:ain
sailors, build ships, purchase aircraft, -in short, to perform the Navy's core mission of fighting
the country's wars, deterring aggression; and maintaining the .freedom of the seas.
The fraud committed by Mr. Hubbard and others has undermined the taxpayer's trust in the
.Navy as a good financial steward. Taxpayers trust that the Navy only asks for what it needs,
knowing that there are many other important and vital uses for limited funds. The Navy invests
an enormous amount of time, energy, and pride in building this trust, and because of that, the
military is generally considered one of the most trusted institutions in America. But it only takes
the misconduct of a few individuals to erode that essential tlust- misconduct like Mr. Hubbard's.
Mr. Hubbard's actions had far-reaching consequences for the United States, its employees,
the City of San Francisco, the local residents, and the taxpayers. The Navy therefore respectfully
requests that the Court consider a severe sentence for Mr. Hubbard that is commensurate with the
adverse impacts of his fraud upon the Navy.
Sincerely,

~~ DCA&ln~V~
LAURA DUCHNAK
Director
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APPENDIX V

DECLARATION OF STEVEN J. CASTLEMAN

1. My name is Steven J. Castleman. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of
California. Together with my co-counsel, David Anton, I represent Greenaction for
Health and Environmental Justice in this action and a Petition seeking to revoke the
federal Materials License of Tetra Tech, EC, Inc. (“Tetra Tech”), License number 2931396-01, issued by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”). The Petition is pending
before the Executive Director for Operations of the NRC. That Petition (Exhibit 1 to this
action), supported by statements under penalty of perjury, demonstrates Tetra Tech
engaged in widespread fraud, including reporting fraudulent sampling and scanning data,
which has compromised the remediation of radioactive contamination at the Hunters
Point Naval Shipyard in San Francisco, California (“Shipyard”).
2. The U.S. Navy hired contractors to review the data reported by Tetra Tech in an attempt
to ascertain which, if any, of those data are reliable. One or more of those contractors
wrote the reports entitled Draft Radiological Data Evaluation Findings Report for
Parcels B and G Soil, dated September 2017, which is attached to the Supplemental
Filing as Exhibit 1 and Draft Radiological Data Evaluation Findings Report for Parcels
C and E Soil, dated December 2017, which is attached to the Supplemental Filing as
Exhibit 1. It supplements the evidence of fraud and was not known at the time of the
filing of the Petition.
3. On January 12, 2018, I had a telephone conversation with Dr. Kathryn A. Higley, a
Professor and Head of the School of Nuclear Science and Engineering in the College of

1

Engineering at Oregon State University. She has been hired by the U.S. Navy to act as a
Community Technical Liaison for the radiation cleanup at the Shipyard.
4. During our phone conversation, Dr. Higley told me that the Navy has concluded, after
data reviews including the one represented by Exhibit 1, that virtually all of the data
reported by Tetra Tech is suspect. Later in our conversation she qualified what she said,
saying a substantial but undefined proportion of Tetra Tech’s data was “to a large extent
useless.” She also informed me that substantial re-sampling and re-scanning will be
required to determine the full impact of Tetra Tech’s fraud on the cleanup and the
planning process for that project is currently under way.
5. On January 31, 2018, I attended a Community Open House meeting hosted by the Navy
concerning the Hunters Point Shipyard radiological cleanup. Prior to the meeting I had a
conversation with Derek Robinson, of the Navy’s Base Realignment and Closure
Program Management Office West (“BRAC PMO West”). He is the person in charge of
the cleanup of the shipyard on behalf of the Navy. During our conversation, Mr.
Robinson confirmed what Dr. Higley told me; the Navy had lost confidence in the Tetra
Tech data. Mr. Robinson also said that the Navy was going to treat all Tetra Tech’s data
as unreliable and resample all locations where Tetra Tech did radiological work.
6. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

June 26, 2018
___________________
Date

______________________________
Steven J. Castleman
Attorney at Law
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APPENDIX VI

Steven Castleman
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:

Steven Castleman
Tuesday, January 30, 2018 4:26 PM
'Robinson, Derek J CIV NAVFAC HQ, BRAC PMO'
David Anton; 'Bradley Angel'; brian@greenaction.org
List of Witnesses/Meeting Request
Witness list for Navy-2.pdf

Mr. Robinson,
Attached is the list of potential witnesses to the Tetra Tech fraud who should be interviewed.
The descriptions of what they know are based on information developed from other witnesses; they are not meant to
limit the subject matter of interviews, but rather to act as a starting point for inquiry. Trained, professional investigators
should be hired who will seek to learn all the witnesses know about Tetra Tech’s fraudulent activities and who will
follow up on any additional leads that result from such interviews.
I will await your response to our meeting request.
See you tomorrow evening.
Sincerely,
Steve Castleman

From: Robinson, Derek J CIV NAVFAC HQ, BRAC PMO [mailto:derek.j.robinson1@navy.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, January 30, 2018 8:06 AM
To: Steven Castleman
Subject: RE: Meeting Request/List of Witnesses

Dear Mr. Castleman,
I will not be able to meet this week, but have been discussing your request internally and should have a
response by early next week.
Thank you for your patience.
Best Regards,
Derek J. Robinson, PE
BRAC Environmental Coordinator
Navy BRAC PMO West
33000 Nixie Way; Bldg 50
San Diego CA 92147
Desk Phone: 619-524-6026
1

-----Original Message----From: Steven Castleman [mailto:scastleman@ggu.edu]
Sent: Monday, January 29, 2018 11:54 AM
To: Robinson, Derek J CIV NAVFAC HQ, BRAC PMO
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Meeting Request/List of Witnesses
Mr. Robinson,

I told you I would get you a list by last Friday of percipient witnesses that should be interviewed in the Tetra
Tech case. Unfortunately, It that will have to be delayed until later this afternoon or tomorrow because I have
gotten tied up on other pressing matters. I apologize for the delay.

On a different subject, are you able to meet this Thursday or Friday? If not, can we schedule a meeting that fits
with your calendar?

Thank you.

Steve Castleman
Visiting Associate Professor & Staff Attorney
Environmental Law and Justice Clinic
415-442-6675 | scastleman@ggu.edu <mailto:scastleman@ggu.edu>
GGU Law Logo - Email
Facebook Logo <http://www.facebook.com/ggulaw> Instagram Logo <http://www.instagram.com/ggulaw>
LinkedIn Logo <https://www.linkedin.com/edu/golden-gate-university-school-of-law-17859> Twitter Logo
<http://www.twitter.com/ggulaw> Youtube Logo <http://www.youtube.com/goldengatelaw>

WARNING: This E-mail, and any attachments, are covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C. §2510-2521. This email may contain confidential and legally privileged information. The contents of
this e-mail, and any attachments, are intended solely for the use of the person or entity to whom the e-mail was
addressed. This email may also contain information that may be protected by the attorney-client privilege,
work-product doctrine, or other privileges, and may be restricted from disclosure by applicable Federal and
2

State laws. If you are not the intended recipient of this email you are advised that any dissemination,
distribution, or use of the contents of this message is strictly prohibited. If you received this e-mail message in
error, please contact the sender by reply e-mail or phone. Please also permanently delete all copies of the
original e-mail and any attachments.
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Steven Castleman
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:

Steven Castleman
Friday, February 16, 2018 1:08 PM
'Robinson, Derek J CIV NAVFAC HQ, BRAC PMO'
'Bradley Angel'; brian@greenaction.org; David Anton; 'Fairbanks, Brianna';
'lee.lily@epa.gov'
Additional Witnesses
2.16.18.ltr.robinson.pdf

Dear Mr. Robinson,
Attached please find a letter to you supplementing the witness list I sent you on January 30, 2018. It contains 5
additional names, all of whom worked in the on‐site laboratory and whom we have reason to believe have personal
knowledge of improper sample and data manipulation.
The letter also seeks a response to our August 2017 request for a meeting with you.
Steve Castleman
Visiting Associate Professor & Staff Attorney
Environmental Law and Justice Clinic
415‐442‐6675 | scastleman@ggu.edu
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APPENDIX VII

RADIOLOGICAL SURVEY REPORT
NWTS #:Par A M/H Bkg Brick 012804

Page __1_ of __1_
INSTRUMENTATION USED

DATE:

January 28, 2004

TIME:

0800 hours

SURVEYOR:

Bert Bowers

LOCATION:

Manhole, Par A
(brick)

REVIEWED BY:

Daryl DeLong

R dose rates = R/hr;

survey results = CPM

MODEL
Ludlum:
19
Ludlum:
2350-1
Ludlum:
2360

S/N

EFF.%

BKRD

CAL. DUE DATE

101733

N/A

5-10

October 1, 2004

82955

N/A

10,514
CPM

August 21, 2004

178154

 12%
 6%

2 CPM
255CPM

October 13, 2004

R/hr

PURPOSE OF SURVEY:
Establish background reference area/levels (from non-impacted M/H location) similar to
M/H’s to be accessed for pneumatic plug installation (i/s sanitary sewer system).

Survey Results

_______________________________________________________________
#







R

1

2

317

15996

5

2

4

349

15549

5

3

4

325

16502

7

4

3

419

16022

6

5

4

348

15858

6

6

365
300

15758

7

2
2

16384

6
6

8

0

378

16304

7

9

1

335

15635

5

10

2

334

18530

10

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

Remarks: Composite sample collected from w/i manhole trench___________

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

______________________________________________________________

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

______________________________________________________________

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

New World Technology FORM NWT-001

Gamma Spectroscopy Results
Sample results given in (pCi/g)
NWT Field Report
Ufo ID
2N000031

Sample Description
Parcel A - 01(concrete) 259g 1/28/04 8:40

Dry Weight (g)
259

Time Counted (s)
2699.1

Library Path
Hunter's Point 1.Lib

Operator
Paul Wall

Reviewed By:

Nuclide
AC-228

Net Activity
7.1877E-01

MDA
2.2938E-01

Uncertainty
4.9014E-01

Soil DCGL
*NA

AM-241

*<MDA

1.9088E-01

**

7.8000E+00

BI-212

*<MDA

6.0497E-01

**

*NA

BI-214

3.3371E-01

1.6542E-01

2.2379E-01

*NA

CO-60

1.9866E-02

1.5430E-02

3.4409E-02

4.2000E-01

Cs-137

*<MDA

9.6968E-02

**

1.3000E-01

EU-152

2.8179E-01 *F

1.2557E-01

2.2543E-01

1.3000E-01

EU-154

1.0062E-01

9.2507E-02

8.6375E-02

2.3000E-01

K-40

6.3481E+00

1.5329E+00

2.7700E+00

*NA

PA-234

*<MDA

1.1496E-01

**

*NA

PB-212

2.8228E-01

1.1802E-01

2.4798E-01

*NA

PB-214

5.1734E-01

1.6069E-01

3.2927E-01

*NA

RA-226

2.9653E+00

1.2805E+00

3.3784E+00

Th-230

2.2995E+01

1.3831E+01

4.9315E+01

*NA

Th-232

1.2421E+01

2.0385E+01

**

*NA

TH-234

1.1117E+00

1.8065E+00

**

*NA

*<MDA

5.4340E-02

**

3.4542E-01

9.9026E-01

Tl-208
U-235

5.9660E-01 #F

Date Acquired
02-Feb-04

Time Acquired
11:59:35 AM

Date Sampled
28-Jan-04

Time Sampled
8:40:00 AM

2.0000E+00

*NA
5.7000E-01

*F=Failed energy identification fraction and key energy tests demonstrating non-existence of the nuclide
#F = All energy peakes determining this isotope had bad poisson shape; this distortion signifies non-existence of the
radionuclide
*<DCGL=Nuclide failed key line energy and shape tests and is determined not to be present in sample
*<MDA = Activity for this Nuclide is less than the Minimum Detectable Activity (MDA)
** = Activity for this Nuclide is less than the MDA, therefore no Uncertainty is neccesary
*NA = No DCGL available for this Nuclide
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Gamma Spectroscopy Results
Sample results given in (pCi/g)
NWT Field Report
Ufo ID
2N000030

Sample Description
Parcel A - 02 259g 1/28/04 8:35

Dry Weight (g)
259

Time Counted (s)
2698.88

Library Path
Hunter's Point 1.Lib

Operator
Paul Wall

Reviewed By:

Nuclide
AC-228

Net Activity
*<MDA

MDA
4.5302E-01

Uncertainty
**

Soil DCGL
*NA

AM-241

6.0949E-02

2.1121E-01

**

7.8000E+00

BI-212

1.0652E+00

6.4706E-01

1.0652E+00

*NA

BI-214

8.6659E-01

1.7318E-01

4.8374E-01

*NA

CO-60

2.6491E-03

1.5431E-02

**

4.2000E-01

Cs-137

*<MDA

1.0565E-01

**

1.3000E-01

EU-152

1.9823E-01 *F

1.4611E-01

2.3041E-01

1.3000E-01

EU-154

1.3078E-01

9.7271E-02

2.6244E-01

2.3000E-01

K-40

1.2301E+01

1.5329E+00

3.3491E+00

*NA

PA-234

3.4336E-01

2.3155E-01

5.9886E-01

*NA

PB-212

1.1345E+00

1.4311E-01

3.1889E-01

*NA

PB-214

1.1768E+00

1.5021E-01

4.4135E-01

*NA

RA-226

3.1165E+00

1.4884E+00

4.0652E+00

Th-230

*<MDA

1.2723E+01

**

*NA

Th-232

2.6165E+01

2.4733E+01

4.5565E+01

*NA

TH-234

*<MDA

1.8332E+00

**

*NA

*<MDA

7.7685E-02

**

3.5179E-01

9.7145E-01

Tl-208
U-235

6.1342E-01 #F

Date Acquired
02-Feb-04

Time Acquired
10:58:20 AM

Date Sampled
09-Feb-04

Time Sampled
8:30:00 AM

2.0000E+00

*NA
5.7000E-01

*F=Failed energy identification fraction and key energy tests demonstrating non-existence of the nuclide
#F = All energy peakes determining this isotope had bad poisson shape; this distortion signifies non-existence of the
radionuclide
*<DCGL=Nuclide failed key line energy and shape tests and is determined not to be present in sample
*<MDA = Activity for this Nuclide is less than the Minimum Detectable Activity (MDA)
** = Activity for this Nuclide is less than the MDA, therefore no Uncertainty is neccesary
*NA = No DCGL available for this Nuclide
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